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faith passes out of the region of hypothesis. In presence of this practical exactitude, derived from experience, we may well forget that, in theory, this too is but an inference from experience."

But if the testimony of human experience were unanimous what, by the methods of science, could it prove? Surely no more than that Jesus was the greatest moral teacher *so far* within that period of the history of our planet which is covered by our historical knowledge. It could only place him in the position in which some one else—perhaps Buddha, perhaps Socrates,—was before the Sermon on the Mount. And it could give no ground to suppose that he might not be displaced to-morrow by a new teacher, as they had been displaced by him. This would scarcely be enough for Archdeacon Wilson, who, in the second sermon, speaks of the Incarnation as "unique." But what more could be reached by this path?

I am not attempting to deny that Theology can start from experience and reach universal results. I believe that it can. But I submit that it must employ, not the methods of science, but such methods as those by which Kant and Hegel arrived at a truth which is both deeper and broader than the truths of science. It is with metaphysics, not science, that Theology has to reckon. This, no doubt, is to be regretted for many reasons. For Theology has a message she desires to deliver to the average man. And the average man, while he is inclined to trust the methods of science, neither trusts nor understands the methods of metaphysics—at any rate, at present. But although it is to be regretted, I do not see how it can be avoided.

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IDEALISM AND THEOLOGY: A Study of Presuppositions. By Charles F. d'Arcy, B. D. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. viii., 294.

In this book the author starts from a partial acceptance of the idealism of T. H. Green, but holding that this idealism fails to furnish a complete philosophy he seeks to show that it finds its true development or correction in a conception, which itself is found to coincide with Christian Theism. According to Green the principle of the world is a self-consciousness the nature of which is to be conceived after the analogy of the human consciousness, the human consciousness being in fact but a partial

manifestation of the divine. The author admits the truth of this view so far, that self-consciousness is necessarily the ultimate category of our thought, but argues that the ultimate nature of reality cannot be fully expressed in terms of self-consciousness. God is personal, but He is also more than personal. The ultimate unity is not a personal unity, but a unity of persons, a unity in which all personal spirits find their bond of union (p. 93). And thus we are brought to a conception of God which finds its expression and confirmation in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Now setting aside any difficulties which might be raised in regard to the idealistic starting point or the theological goal of this argument, there seem to be several serious difficulties in the course of the argument itself. In the first place, it is difficult to understand the *combination* of the predicates, personal and superpersonal as applied to the ultimate reality. The very argument by which it is shown that the ultimate or divine unity must be *superpersonal* in order to be a *unity of persons* seems wholly to forbid us to conceive God as personal. Secondly, the connection between this philosophical doctrine of a superpersonal unity and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity seems to be merely superficial. For either the divine persons fall to the level of finite persons or there are two unities, a unity of divine persons and a unity of finite persons. This objection is admitted by the author in his concluding chapter to demand a clear answer. How far the demand is satisfied the reader may judge. "The answer," it is said, "has been given, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The human person is . . . . a person and nothing more. He cannot rise to the absolute point of view and see all in one. He attains final unity by an act of faith. . . . Such limitation cannot be attributed to the Divine Persons. In what way the ultimate unity belongs to them, how they inhere in it and it in them, it is impossible for us to say" (pp. 266-7). The combination of the predicates, personal and superpersonal was difficult enough, but to these we are asked to add the Trinitarian predicate multipersonal. "As person, or rational intelligence, [God] is immanent in nature. As multipersonal, He transcends nature, and interferes in nature, just as one human will interferes in the experience of another. As superpersonal, He unites all in one, and occupies a position of transcendency in a higher sense" (p. 153). It is somewhat surprising to find that this additional Trinitarian element is brought forward as the clue to a difficulty.

Finally, although the author believes that his proposed reconciliation of philosophy and Christian theology also affords a solution of various religious or theological difficulties, its value in this respect seems to be a matter more of belief or assertion than of demonstration. For instance, speaking of the problem of predestination the author states the difficulty as follows: "The difficulty involved in the old problem of predestination is precisely the same as that which came to light in the consideration of the relation between free-will and necessity. If full sway be given to the Divine Personality, it swallows up the human. If the rights of the human personality be asserted against the Divine, the latter suffers limitation, it becomes one among many, it ceases to be truly Divine. We have to choose between a freedom of God which annihilates man and a freedom of man which annihilates God. The only way out of the difficulty is that already indicated: the assumption of a transcendent superpersonal unity as the ultimate truth of the Divine Nature" (pp. 170-1). Would it be unfair to say that the only obvious connection between the solution of the problem and the assumed superpersonal unity is that both are beyond our knowledge? It is, at any rate, not quite apparent how the superpersonal nature of the divine unity can affect the question of human freedom one way or the other. And perhaps it may be said generally that the assumption of a transcendent principle of explanation is little more than an admission that an explanation is required which we cannot give. That the assumption is not without its dangers may be seen from the following expressions. "Just as, on the side of knowledge, the effort to harmonize the human self with the Divine, forces us to appeal to a principle of reconciliation which is transcendent, so, on the volitional side, the effort to give the human will its place in a universal system discloses an opposition which no effort of thought can overcome. We have to choose between philosophy and human nature, between theory and fact; and in that choice theory must go to the wall" (p. 107). A theology which finds its "opportunity" in the supposed difficulties and failures of philosophy is one which is open to suspicion from the religious no less than from the speculative point of view.

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